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DEALER-LOCATION CLAUSES
Antitrust Law-Enforcement of Dealer-Location Clauses
Declared Per Se Illegal
The 1967 decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.' has had a dramatic impact on the busi-
ness world's attempts to comply with federal antitrust guidelines. In
Schwinn the Court held that vertically imposed territorial and customer
restraints2 were to be examined under the rule of reason if the manu-
facturer retained "title, dominion, and risk" over his product, but were
per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Ac if similar restraints
were imposed by the manufacturer when the transaction constituted a
sale of the product. 5 The Ninth Circuit was recently faced with the
problem of defining the scope of Schwinn in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Con-
tinental T.V., Inc.,' a case involving neither territorial nor customer re-
sale restrictions. The court, nevertheless, held that dealer-location re-
strictions7 are per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act
when they are enforced by the manufacturer. 8
The dispute in Sylvania resulted from a new distribution scheme
initiated by the manufacturer, Sylvania, with which it attempted to limit
the number of franchises in a given area. The plan was devised to
reduce intrabrand competition among retailers with the ultimate goal
of fostering interbrand competition for Sylvania products. In the fall
of 1965, Continental, one of Sylvania's largest dealers, opened an unau-
1. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
2. A vertically imposed territorial restraint exists when a manufacturer transfers
his products to a distributor with the restriction that the distributor resell the products
only to retailers in a particular territory. The manufacturer could also deal directly with
the retailer and impose similar restraints. On the other hand, a customer resale restraint
prohibits the distributor or retailer from reselling to a particular class of customers.
See P. AEEDA, ANTrUsr ANALYSIS 530-31 (2d ed. 1974); Note, Restricted Channels
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HRv. L. REv. 795 (1962).
3. Mr. Chief Justice White launched the rule of reason in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The test is designed to analyze the reason for the
restraint and its effect as a restraint on competition.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act was passed in 1890 and
states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce. . . is declared to be illegal."
5. 388 U.S. at 379-80. All of the following analysis in this note pertains equally
to a manufacturer dealing directly with a retailer as well as imposing similar restraints
regarding the retailer's dealing with other retailers or the general public.
6. 1974 Trade Cas. 96,792 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted,
Civil No. 71-1705 (Dec. 12, 1974).
7. The typical dealer-location clause designates the location of the place of busi-
ness for which a franchise is issued and requires the franchisor's consent for the fran-
chisee to open a second outlet. See Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After
Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L REv. 595, 603 (1968).
8. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,795.
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thorized store in an area in which Sylvania considered the market to
be sufficiently developed. Despite Sylvania's objections, Continental
shipped products from its authorized store to the unauthorized store.
In an effort to enforce its dealer-location restrictions, Sylvania refused
to extend further credit to Continental and accelerated prior balances.
Such action had the effect of ending Continentars original franchise and
driving it out of business.9
Continental filed a treble damage antitrust action 0 in federal dis-
trict court."' In response to the judge's instructions, which interpreted
the scope of Schwinn quite broadly, the jury returned a verdict against
Sylvania.' 2 Sylvania appealed, alleging that the trial judge's instruc-
tions were erroneous.
The Ninth Circuit stated that Sylvania had the legal right geo-
graphically to space exclusive dealerships' 3 and probably could have
used legal means to prevent Continental from professing to have a sec-
ond authorized, franchised dealership.' 4  Nevertheless, when Sylvania
attempted to prevent Continental from opening a second outlet by low-
ering Continental's credit limit and by demanding payment of some ac-
counts receivable, the situation came within the censure of the Schwinn
rule.' 5
The court rejected ,ylvania's contention that, since franchise-lo-
cation clauses are legal, enforcement of them must likewise be legal,
9. Id. at 96,793.
10. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides for treble dam-
age relief in private antitrust actions. Section 4 reads in part: "[Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
11. The action was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia. Retired United States Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, sitting by designation,
presided over the trial. John P. McGuire & Co. v. Continental T.V., Inc., Civil No.
44251 TCC (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1971), affirmed sub nom. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Con-
tinental T.V., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. 96,792 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing en bane
granted, Civil No. 71-1705 (Dec. 12, 1974).
12. The judge assumed that Schwinn applied and as a result asked the jury simply:
"Did Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., engage in a contract, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws with respect to location restrictions
alone?" This charge is quoted in the court of appeals opinion. 1974 Trade Cas. at
96,793.
13. See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972). An exclusive
distributorship is established when a manufacturer agrees not to place another distributor
in the initial distributor's territory.
14. The court gave no examples of the legal means at Sylvania's disposal. Pre-
sumably these would be based on breach of contract or false advertising theories.
15. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,794-95.
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or at least not per se illegal. In the majority's view the illegality arose
from the manufacturer's attempts to enforce -the agreement by interfer-
ing with Continental's establishment of a second outlet. The court,
however, failed to discuss the issue of conspiracy, a required element
of all section 1 violations. It stated that "absent any anticompetitive
motive and effect" Sylvania could have cancelled Continental's fran-
chise. 6 Such anticompetitive motive and effect were exhibited by Syl-
vania's intent to limit intrabrand competition by preventing the opening
of Continental's second outlet.17 The court reasoned that, because Syl-
vania parted with dominion, risk, and control over the products, under
Schwinn, Continental could resell to unfranchised retailers without Syl-
vania's approval. The court concluded that "there is no apparent rea-
son why [the antitrust laws] should not also protect the transfer if Con-
tinental itself is the retailer."' 8
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court radically changed its attitude toward vertically
imposed territorial and customer resale restraints in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,'9 by holding that when a manufacturer sells
his product to a distributor or retailer subject to such restraints, a per
se violation of the Sherman Act results.20 According to the Court, after
a manufacturer has transferred title and relinquished dominion over the
product, "it is unreasonable without more" to restrict the areas in which
or the persons with whom a product may be traded.2' Schwinn deter-
mined that such restraints had sufficient detrimental effect on intra-
brand competition to warrant a strong proscriptive rule. In the Court's
view such a per se rule would foster intrabrand competition.
16. Id. at 96,794.
17. It is necessary to refer to the dissent to discern the meaning of the majority's
conclusion. Judge Ely, dissenting, stated:
The issue is whether a manufacturer-seller can enforce a location clause against
its franchisee by terminating the latter's franchise if he opens an outlet at an
unauthorized location. The majority has not only decided that the manufac-
turer could not lawfully refuse to sell to the breaching franchisee in this in-
stance, but has also held that a unilateral termination of the franchise in order
to enforce a location clause is a per se violation in restraint of trade.
Id. at 96,796.
18. Id. at 96,795.
19. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
20. Id. at 379. The Court reasoned: "RTo allow this freedom where the manu-
facturer has parted with dominion over the goods-the usual marketing situation-would
violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity
of outlets and limitation of territory further than prudence permits." Id. at 380.
21. Id. at 379.
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The Schwinn rule encourages alternative distribution methods,
some of which are available only to large companies. Chief among
these are consignment programs and vertical integration, both of which
require substantial capital investment.12  The latter method has proved
appealing to many large companies. 23  But practical and legal risks ac-
companying such business practices often deter their implementation. 24
Moreover, numerous optional distribution plans are at a small com-
pany's disposal, thus tending to limit the impact of Schwinn.25
Schwinn has been criticized more for the analysis and principle
used to decide the case than for the result reached. Use of "the an-
cient rule against restraints on alienation" is better viewed as a consci-
entious attempt by the Court to create a bright line test in an otherwise
complex area rather than as a correct legal doctrine.20  Regardless,
easy circumvention of -the Schwinn rule has led many commentators to
question whether Schwinn has accomplished its intended goal-an in-
22. The government in Schwinn outlined the virtue of vertical integration by not-
ing the cost savings and economies. Brief for the United States at 50. Vertical integra-
tion through merger (e.g., Schwinn purchasing an independent distributor's assets) is
treated more leniently than restraints vertically imposed upon distributors because verti-
cal integration is subjected to the rule of reason test. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Pollock, supra note 7, at 608-09.
23. In fact, vertical integration is what has occurred with Schwinn, in spite of the
fact that the government assured the Supreme Court that forward integration was "un-
likely, .... an entirely remote possibility," and "wholly lacking in credibility." Brief for
the United States at 29, 50. See Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAw. 669, 686-87
(1968); Pollock, supra note 7, at 610.
24. Brown Shoe subjects vertical integration through merger to rule of reason
analysis. See note 22 supra. In addition, it is conceivable that a consignment plan
would be held to transfer to the consignee insufficient "dominion" or "risk" over the
product. Should sufficient transfer be recognized by the court in a particular case, the
overall nature of the plan is still to be given rule of reason consideration. See note 27
infra.
25. Other restrictive practices limiting intrabrand competition but which have been
held not to violate Schwinn are: primary responsibility clauses requiring dealers to con-
centrate their efforts in particular territories, Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco,
Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); primary responsibil-
ity clauses with a profit pass-over for sales made outside the designated territory, Supe-
rior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. 111. 1972); and ex-
clusive distributorships, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
26. A noted commentator in the field observes that this can only be classified as
a kind of "instant tradition," where an irrelevant property concept is applied to an anti-
trust issue. See Pollock, supra note 7, at 601. The words of Emerson are applicable
for the rigid inflexibility of the Schwinn rule. Emerson said, "'Generalization is always
a new influx of the divinity into the mind. Hence the thrill that attends it.'" He refers
to generalizations as the so-called "law" of the "least effort," a common way of breeding
new problems in order to avoid old problems. Quoted in Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d
585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952).
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crease in intrabrand competition.2 7 Various federal courts, realizing
the great impact of the Schwinn per se -rule, have sought to limit the
rule by construing it narrowly. The most serious and legally question-
able inroad into Schwinn was made by Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Par-
fums, Inc.,28 in which the Second Circuit declined to apply Schwinn's
per se rule because the manufacturer had not firmly insisted on compli-
ance with the contractual terms that required retailers to restrict their
direct dealings to certain customers. 29  A logical inference from
Janel and similar cases limiting Schwinn is that the lower courts find
27. Schwinn has been criticized because the form of the transaction appears to be
more important than the substance of the transaction. To avoid 'chwinn, a manufac-
turer needs only retain dominion and control over the product by establishing a consign-
ment or agency plan. Such a plan would subject the manufacturer to the rule of reason
test rather than the per se prohibition. See Pollock, supra note 7, at 610-12; Note, Re-
strictive Distribution Arrangements After the Schwinn Case, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv. 514
(1968).
28. 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968).
29. Janel is similar to Sylvania in that enforcement is considered the wrongful act.
Janel reached this result by observing that in Schwinn the Supreme Court had noted that
Schwinn had been "firm and resolute" in insisting on compliance with its restrictive
agreements. 388 U.S. at 372. It seems clear that Schwinn's discussion of such enforce-
ment was designed merely to prove an agreement imposing territorial and customer re-
strictions. For that reason, Janel is an analytically incorrect limitation of Schwinn.
Janel's limitation was mentioned but not definitely accepted by the Third Circuit in
Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970). The Tenth Circuit simply followed Janel without adding anything instructive.
Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 987 (1973). A district court in the Second Circuit, Janel's circuit, upheld the
validity of the "firm and resolute exception" but found that Schwinn had nevertheless
been violated. United States v. Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 91,697 (D.
Conn.). The Second and Tenth Circuits are the only ones that have carved this excep-
tion out of the strict Schwinn prohibition.
The Supreme Court appeared to leave open the possibility that exceptions to the
per se rule would be permissible when it stated that "it is unreasonable without more"
for the manufacturer to impose territorial or customer restraints after transferring do-
minion over the product to the distributor or retailer. 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis
added). The Third Circuit seized this language to create a "reasonableness exception"
to the Schwinn rule. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., supra. It is questionable whether
Schwinn permits such an exception. E.g., United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969); see Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1975). In Coors the Tenth Circuit took
note of the Schwinn rule in striking down territorial restrictions in the distribution of
Coors Beer despite arguments by appellant that the plan was conceived in order to pre-
serve the quality of the product. Id. at 1186. Such a refusal to use the "reasonableness
exception" points out the rigid aspect of the Schwinn rule and is a counterargument that
the rule is not being extensively limited by the lower federal courts. The validity of
the "reasonableness exception" can be inferred from the fact that the Schwinn Court
specifically pointed out that Schwinn was not a newcomer or a failing company and
therefore should be subjected to a per se ruling. 388 U.S. at 374. This implies that
the Court intended to limit the scope of the Schwinn rule in certain instances. The
Ninth Circuit in Sylvania did not accept Sylvania's argument that the "failing-company"
rule applied in the instant case. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,795-96.
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the strict proscriptive rule of Schwinn unnecessarily harsh and far-
reaching. In addition, it has been argued that Schwinn unduly empha-
sized the form over the substance of the transaction by limiting its ruling
to transfers between manufacturers and dealers that pass "dominion"
over the product.3 0
The Ninth Circuit in Sylvania failed to recognize and respond to
these criticisms. Instead it continued to emphasize the form of the
transaction by holding that enforcement of dealer-location clauses by
the manufacturer is per se unlawful because such enforcement prevents
the distributor from transferring products and dealing to his second out-
let."' Sylvania offered only one reason for including the enforcement
of dealer-location clauses within the proscriptive rule of Schwinn: since
Schwinn guaranteed Continental the right to sell to discounters or other
unauthorized customers, the court saw no apparent reason why the
Sherman Act should not protect the transfer if Continental itself is the
retailer.32
Such analysis is incomplete, however. First, Schwinn debatably
was not intended to affect dealer-location clauses. In his final decree
in the Schwinn case on remand from the Supreme Court, Judge Perry
specifically authorized Schwinn's use of location clauses in its franchise
agreements.3 8 Since such clauses are not illegal according to the Su-
preme Court in Schwinn and the Ninth Circuit in Sylvania, it appears
anomalous that enforcement of a location clause would be impermis-
sible. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such enforcement if
done with anticompetitive motive and effect is per se illegal. If a man-
ufacturer establishes an exclusive distributorship in one area and then
proceeds to grant distributorships elsewhere he would appear to be un-
der a contractual duty to prevent his distributors from invading the ter-
ritory of a particular area's exclusive distributor. If this area is invaded,
the dealer could conceivably have an action for breach of contract
against the manufacturer.
Secondly, Sylvania's failure to analyze carefully the substance of
the vertically imposed restraint frustrates the underlying intent of
Schwinn to proscribe only those restraints that unduly interfere with in-
trabrand competition. By carrying Schwinn to its logical extreme, Syl-
30. See note 27 supra.
31. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
32. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,795.
33. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564, 566 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
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vania avoided the necessary analysis of the anticompetitive effect of
dealer-location clauses as compared with territorial restraints."4 If
dealer-location clauses do not restrain intrabrand competition to the ex-
tent that territorial restrictions do, the Ninth Circuit has improperly ex-
tended Schwinn. In addition, since per se rules are created only after
careful analysis of the economic impact of the restraints involved, the
decision in Sylvania is definitely unwarranted.3 5
In light of these criticisms, a better approach to determine the le-
gality of dealer-location clauses would be to examine the cases dealing
with such clauses prior to Schwinn and then to compare the substantive
impact of dealer-location clauses with the substantive effect of vertically
imposed territorial restrictions that were found to be unlawful per se
in Schwinn.30 From the inception of the Sherman Act in 1890 until
Schwinn was decided in 1967, neither territorial resale restrictions nor
dealer-location clauses had been held to be a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. The illegality of vertically imposed territorial resale re-
straints was clearly established by Schwinn, but the rule of reason re-
mained the appropriate test whenever the manufacturer maintained do-
minion over the product. Although dealer-location clauses have never
been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court, such a clause was
upheld by the Second Circuit in Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors
34. Sylvania relied on the customer resale restraint aspect of location clauses to
hold their enforcement per se unlawful; however, calling such restraints customer limita-
tions is at best arguable when what is prevented is solely transfer of products between
two outlets.
35. Ironically, the Supreme Court itself ignored its own earlier admonition when
it established the Schwinn per se rule. The Court had warned in White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), that it did "not know enough of the economic and
business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" to install a per se rule against
vertically imposed restraints. Id. at 263. The Schwinn Court established a per se
rule following no analysis of interbrand competition. Since per se rules normally are
pronounced after careful economic analysis of the involved restraint, such analysis
should by necessity include the possibility of overall benefits to competition. See Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
36. A third type of restraint, an exclusive distributorship, is invariably sought by
the distributor to give him a chance to infiltrate an area with advertising and to establish
a clientele. The distributor often needs such protection to make the initial fixed costs
worthwhile. An adverse effect on intrabrand competition results when the distributor
is given an exclusive distributorship; however, retailers in that area are not restricted,
since they do not have to deal with the exclusive distributor. Exclusive distributorships
have never been considered unlawful, even following Schwinn. See note 25 supra. In
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Supreme Court
specifically refused to outlaw exclusive distributorships as violative of the antitrust laws.
See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
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Corp.37 as not being an "unreasonable interference with competition.""8
Prior to Schwinn there had been little litigation over dealer-location
clauses because they had been held to be subject to rule of reason anal-
ysis. Because of similarities with territorial resale restrictions, the situ-
ation regarding dealer-location restrictions, however, has become unset-
tled as a result of Schwinn.
Dealer-location restrictions resemble territorial restrictions in some
respeots. A territorial restriction prevents a distributor from selling the
manufacturer's product to a retailer outside a prescribed area. If a
manufacturer is careful not to have the territories of the dealers over-
lap, he can effectively prevent intrabrand competition. The situation
is similar to that involving dealer-location restrictions except that, in-
stead of being careful not to have the territories of his dealers overlap,
the manufacturer must take pains to space his distributors. If the man-
ufacturer spaces his distributors, intrabrand competition will be checked
only to the extent that transportation costs and retailer knowledge of
existing distributors make it inconvenient or economically unwise for
a retailer to purchase from the distributor who is not the nearest one
to the retailer's shop.
Dealer-location restrictions, however, have two crucial characteris-
tics that make them less anticompetitive than territorial restrictions.
First, a dealer-location restriction does not prevent a distributor from
selling to a retailer located outside the distributor's zone.39 If a dis-
tributor wants to compete with other distributors by cutting his price,
he can make it feasible for a distant retailer to deal with him rather
than with the closer distributor. Territorial restrictions on the other
hand preclude intrabrand competition since they place all retailers in
specific distribution areas and prevent the distributor from selling to
those not within his territory. Secondly, even when the manufacturer
carefully spaces his distributors, there will normally be retailers who are
as far from one distributor as from another. This will usually be the
37. 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943). The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of dealer-
location clauses in United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), but
avoided the question by deciding the case on "classic conspiracy" grounds. The govern-
ment had requested a ruling on the legality of location clauses; however, the Court re-
fused. The dissent in Sylvania incorrectly concluded that this is evidence of the Court's
intention to permit such clauses. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,799. It appears, rather, that
the Court merely avoided an issue that it did not have to decide.
38. 124 F.2d at 823.
39. Specific territories are not set out by the manufacturer when he carefully
spaces distributorships; however, a zone of convenient operations is established in effect.
782 [Vol. 53
DEALER-LOCATION CLA USES
case whenever the manufacturer does not draw the zones by imposing
territorial restrictions but instead relies on carefully spaced distributor-
ships to bring about a similar effect. In short, dealer-location clauses
do not totally prevent two distributors from competing for the same re-
tailers. Since such restrictions are not so anticompetitive as territorial
resale restraints, the Schwinn rule, designed to foster intrabrand compe-
tition, should not be applicable. Enforcement of dealer-location clauses
would be more properly examined under the rule of reason.
Even assuming that the restraint involved in Sylvania is as anticom-
petitive as territorial restrictions and that the enforcement of dealer-
location clauses should be unlawful per se, there are still serious prob-
lems with the court's decision. First, the finding of a conspiracy is an
essential element in all cases based on section 1 of the Sherman Act.4°
The court failed to examine the issue of conspiracy. 41 Had it done so,
it would have found that the Sylvania fact situation is distinguishable
from Schwinn as far as the conspiracy factor is concerned. The agree-
ment between the manufacturer and the distributor formed the nucleus
of the conspiracy in Schwinn. The Ninth Circuit in Sylvania agreed
with the intrinsic legality of dealer-location clauses and thus was argu-
ably foreclosed from concluding that the various contracts between Syl-
vania and its distributors formed the foundation of 'the conspiracy. 3
The manufacturer was the only party interested in the enforcement of
the location clause, and such enforcement by the manufacturer seems
nothing more than unilateral action." The court's decision to allow
40. See note 4 supra.
41. The dissent asserted that a conspiracy did not exist in the case. 1974 Trade
Cas. at 96,798. The dissent accurately observed that it was impossible to find Sylvania's
agent as the necessary partner in the conspiracy since the jury responded to a special
interrogatory that the agent did not engage with Sylvania in a contract, combination,
or conspiracy. Id. at 96,798 n.7.
42. 388 U.S. at 378.
43. Conforming dealers often favor the location clause and, as such, reap its bene-
fits by not having other dealers invade their territories. It is arguable that their acqui-
esbence and adherence to the plan form the basis of a tacit conspiracy. See Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
44. It is possible that such unilateral action could be reached under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970), now that the Su-
preme Court has sanctioned the use of section 5 for the purpose of prohibiting conduct
which is inherently "unfair," even though not specifically violative of any other section
of the antitrust laws. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
This would be true even if the Supreme Court should hold in the future that such con-
duct as that which existed in Janel and Sylvania is unilateral. Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act gives the FTC jurisdiction to declare unlawful "[u]nfair methods
of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce
1975]
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dealer-location clauses but not to permit their enforcement appears in-
consistent with the rule set out in Schwinn. Schwinn itself draws no
such distinction. Often the mere agreement is sufficient to gain the
anticompetitive effect-for example, when all dealers willingly comply
with such a clause to benefit from the limiting of intrabrand competi-
tion.
Secondly, Sylvania specifically stated that Sylvania could have can-
celled Continental's franchise "absent any anticompetitive motive and
effect, '45 a statement -that places the courts in the precarious position
of having to determine motive. A manufacturer could easily disguise
his motive and terminate the distributor's franchise. The anticompeti-
tive effect resulting from a distributor's failure even ,to attempt to open
a second outlet is similar to that which results from a manufacturer's
preventing the attempted opening of a second outlet. This similarity
is especially true when a distributor does not attempt to open a second
outlet because he fears the opening of second outlets in his area by
other distributors. Determination of motive is especially difficult since
the court noted that, "if Sylvania later decided it didn't like Continen-
tal's locations and ceased selling to it, presumably there would be noth-
ing illegal about it."' 46 The court's requirement of enforcement of the
contraotual restraint appears unsound both legally and practically.
When coupled with -the frequent necessity for analysis of motive, the
rule as set out in Sylvania appears to be highly unworkable.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in Sylvania erroneously extended Schwinn un-
der the mistaken belief that it was following the Supreme Court's direc-
tive in Schwinn. Lower federal courts have attempted to limit
Schwinn 7 The Ninth Circuit should have considered cases such as
Janel and limited Schwinn to territorial restrictions. Such consideration
could easily have been done since an examination of the effect of
dealer-location clauses would have shown that the detrimental effect
on intrabrand competition is not so great as with vertically imposed ter-
ritorial restraints.
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Schwinn, warned against the ef-
45. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,794.
46. Id. at 96,795 (emphasis added). Use of the plural "locations" implies that the
manufacturer can cancel the distributor's whole franchise because of the second outlet's
existence. This appears quite contradictory indeed.
47. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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fect of such a per se rule as possibly leading to the elimination of many
small independent competitors. 48  The situation in Sylvania corre-
sponds with that concern. By 1962 Sylvania's share of the television
market had declined to one or two percent. The new distribution pol-
icy had helped it increase its share to five percent in 1965. 41 Even
though it is controlled by General Telephone and Electronics Corpora-
tion, Sylvania has never been a giant in the television industry.
The antitrust laws were initially enacted to prevent monopolies by
a few large companies. It is certain that the underlying purpose of the
antitrust laws is not being served when interbrand competition is sacri-
ficed to encourage intrabrand competition.5 ° The Schwinn rule should
only be applied to territorial resale restraints and other restraints that
have a similar effect of dividing markets and limiting intrabrand compe-
tition. Dealer-location clauses are not such restraints.
JOHN GALE
Constitutional Law-Presidential Pardons and the Connon Law
The Constitution states that "[t]he President shall . . have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment."' In Schick v. Reed' the
United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether
the commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was a valid exercise of the President's
pardoning power.3 A divided Court4 upheld the validity of this com-
mutation, concluding that the power granted the President under article
II, section 2, includes the power to substitute for the sentence imposed
by the trial court another type of sentence not specifically provided for
by statute. 5 In so holding, the Court extended the scope of the Presi-
48. 388 U.S. at 394.
49. 1974 Trade Cas. at 96,793.
50. See note 35 supra.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2.
2. 95 S. Ct. 379 (1974).
3. Id. at 382.
4. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Douglas,
and Brennan dissented in an opinion written by Justice Marshall. Id. at 386.
5. Id. at 384.
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